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Although the Indian and Pakistani governments strongly desire to avoid a fourth war, the coercive 
diplomacy pursued by each side has brought them to the brink of major conflict on more than one 
occasion in recent years. Today tensions remain high, and war is a distinct possibility. Should 
hostilities break out, what are the chances that the fighting could be confined to the use of 
conventional military force? Although both Indian and Pakistani leaders would do everything in 
their power to avoid using nuclear weapons, there are three situations in which a large-scale 
conventional conflict between India and Pakistan could inadvertently escalate to nuclear warfare 
because of the nations' asymmetries in doctrine and military capabilities.[1]  
Conventional Force Comparison 
The conventional military balance is tilted far in India's favor. India has achieved numerical and 
qualitative superiority in many military categories, particularly in mechanized ground forces and in 
attack aircraft. It has a two-to-one advantage in tanks and a three-to-one advantage in modern 
tanks. India also has true infantry fighting vehicles, giving its mechanized infantry much more 
firepower and mobility than the Pakistani infantry. The two-to-one overall advantage in aircraft 
grows to almost a six-to-one advantage when one compares just the most modern and capable 
aircraft - a category in which Pakistan lost its earlier edge after over a decade of U.S.-led 
international sanctions.[2] This disadvantage is very significant because Pakistan has little 
strategic depth; that is, many of its strategic assets are close to its border with India. 
Both India and Pakistan have offensively oriented conventional military doctrines. India has 
developed an offensive-defensive military doctrine that calls for aggressive offensive action to 
pre-empt or counter-attack the enemy. Currently, India is exploring the concept of limited 
conventional war based on the notion of strategic space between low-intensity conflicts and full-
scale conventional war. This concept is fueled by political and public pressure within India to 
launch conventional military strikes against Pakistan in retaliation for Pakistan's alleged support 
of terrorism.[3] The Pakistani army also relies on an offensive-defensive strategy, which is 
characterized by retaining adequate reserves at successive force levels, surprise, and aggressive 
leadership. This strategy calls for the Pakistan army to detect the initial enemy thrust, take 
effective counter measures to limit penetration, and simultaneously attack the adversary to 
capture or threaten a strategic objective.[4]  
Strategic Nuclear Balance 
Each country possesses a stockpile of nuclear weapons components and could assemble and 
deploy several nuclear weapons within a few days to a week.[5] The size, composition, and 
operational status of each nuclear arsenal are closely guarded secrets, but sufficient public 
information exists to make general assumptions about the strategic balance in South Asia.[6]  
Assuming that the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors produce 25-40 kg of bomb-grade 
plutonium annually, by the end of 2002 India could have stockpiled between 280-600 kg of 
weapon-grade plutonium.[7] Although India also has a program to produce highly enriched 
uranium (HEU), it is not known if the program has managed to produce weapon-grade HEU. 
Experts assess that India could require as little as 5 kg and as much as 7 kg of plutonium per 
weapon. Considering the worst- and best-case assumptions about Indian weapon design, it could 
possess enough fissile material for between 40 and 120 weapons, with 70 as the median 
estimate. 
Unlike India, which relies on plutonium for its weapons, Pakistan's nuclear program is based on 
HEU. If Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment plant is able to produce 80-140 kg of weapon-grade 
uranium per year, Pakistan today could have 815-1230 kg available for weapons production. The 
amount required for a bomb is believed to be 12-25 kg, depending on the weapon design 
Pakistan employs. In addition, an unsafeguarded heavy-water research reactor recently 
constructed at Khushab produces plutonium that could be reprocessed to make a few nuclear 
weapons annually. Adding together its possible plutonium and HEU inventories, Pakistan could 
have enough fissile material to produce between 35 and 95 weapons, with 60 as the median 
estimate. 
 
Each state has various aircraft and ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear 
weapons. In 2001, DOD assessed that India would most likely employ fighter-bomber aircraft for 
delivery because its ballistic missiles probably were not yet ready. The air force has several 
aircraft that could be employed for this mission, but the best suited would be the Jaguar, Mirage-
2000, MiG-27, or Su-30. India has deployed short-range Prithvi 1 missiles that are capable of 
carrying a 1000 kg warhead (the presumed maximum size of a nuclear device), but because of 
Prithvi's restricted range, India will probably turn to its new solid-propellant Agni 1 missile, which 
has a 700-900 km range and was rushed into development after the 1999 Kargil conflict. The 
Agni 1 and the 2000-3000 km-range Agni 2 missile are likely to become India's preferred missile 
platforms when they become operational. 
Pakistan has placed a high priority on acquiring ballistic missiles to offset India's conventional 
military advantages and to ensure reliable delivery of nuclear weapons. Although the Pakistan Air 
Force F-16 and Mirage 5 aircraft probably are capable of nuclear delivery, the liquid-fuel Ghauri 1 
and 2 missiles developed with North Korean assistance, and the solid-fuel Shaheen 1 and 2 
missiles developed with Chinese help, are more likely choices.[8] 
 India's draft nuclear doctrine, published in August 1999, is based on a retaliatory, no-first-use 
policy.[9] The doctrine casts Indian nuclear forces principally as a deterrent against a nuclear 
attack on India. Pakistan has not publicly announced an official nuclear doctrine, but it is 
concerned with deterring India from taking advantage of its conventional superiority. Pakistan 
appears to have adopted a nuclear first-use policy to deter India from using its conventional 
military superiority.[10]  
Survivability at Risk 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan has the potential to threaten the 
survival of Pakistan's strategic nuclear forces. However, limited Indian attacks, such as a 
retaliatory strike on the ground or through the air, would not serve as a real threat to Pakistan's 
strategic weapon systems.  
The asymmetries of strategic depth and offensive military capability give India an operational 
advantage, and may create a situation in which India's conventional ground or air forces come 
into contact with Pakistan's strategic nuclear forces. Pakistan's shorter-range Hatf 3/M-11 ballistic 
missiles must be stationed fairly far forward to reach strategic targets in India, perhaps leaving 
them vulnerable to both air and ground attack. The same is true of Pakistan's forward airbases, 
which are within easy striking distance of the border. This is a very troubling scenario because 
Pakistan places great emphasis on its strategic nuclear forces to deter a large-scale conventional 
attack by India. The survival of Pakistan's strategic forces is critical to Pakistan, and a threat to 
them could place pressure on Pakistan to launch a nuclear attack while the strategic forces are 
still intact and capable of making a credible impression upon India.  
India's greater strategic depth allows it to disperse its strategic nuclear forces to areas beyond the 
normal range of enemy ground and air operations. Longer-range platforms, such as the SU-30 
aircraft and the Agni 2 missiles, further decrease Indian vulnerability. When combined with India's 
presumed retaliatory-only nuclear doctrine, this would seem to minimize the possibility of 
Pakistan degrading India's strategic deterrent capability so severely that India is pushed into a 
"use them or lose them" situation. 
Command and Control Threatened 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan also could threaten vital strategic 
command and control functions. This is particularly true for Pakistan since India has made a 
major investment in intelligence gathering and precision-strike capability.[11] There also may be a 
significant overlap between Pakistan's normal conventional operational command and control 
structures that would be subject to attack in a large-scale war and its strategic command and 
control structure. If Pakistan lost command and control of its strategic forces, would national 
command authorities consider ordering the use of remaining strategic nuclear forces while they 
could still affect some degree of deterrence? 
 
Pakistan's presumed inability to identify and attack India's C4I probably precludes any 
appreciable loss of command and control over India's strategic force during a conventional war. 
This is reinforced by a several factors, including India's reliance on negative control features, and 
its greater strategic depth. A conventional attack on India's command and control structures 
probably would cause only a delay in retaliatory nuclear strikes, and not lead to the inadvertent 
use of nuclear weapons. 
There are no indications that India has pre-delegated nuclear release authority. However, New 
Delhi might find that its strategic command and control functions are unable to cope with the 
effects of a full-scale conventional war. Under such circumstances India's senior leadership may 
have to cobble together a system while under pressure. There are no indications that Pakistan 
has pre-delegated nuclear release authority. However, it too may find that its strategic command 
and control functions are unable to cope with the effects of a full-scale war. Pakistan would be 
under tremendous pressure to create a workable system if its strategic command and control 
system is at risk. Pakistan's reliance on nuclear deterrence could force it to adopt pre-delegation 
of nuclear release authority if there were no other method to ensure delivery. 
Fear of Pre-emption 
Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan almost certainly would include air 
and ballistic missile attacks. Attacks by these inherently dual-use systems have the potential to 
be interpreted as pre-emptive attacks to destroy or neutralize the adversary's nuclear capability. 
This is especially true for Pakistan since India has invested heavily in improving its intelligence 
gathering and precision-strike capability. India also has made a major investment in defensive 
measures, including a limited ballistic missile defense.[12] Pakistan may believe that India is 
trying to gain the ability to launch a pre-emptive attack and deny Pakistan the ability to counter 
with an effective second-strike with a reduced force. Could this concern lead Pakistan to adopt a 
launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack posture where any Indian air- or ballistic missile attack 
could be interpreted as a pre-emptive strike and cause Pakistan to launch its nuclear weapons? 
Pakistan's limited ability to identify and attack India's strategic nuclear assets probably precludes 
any appreciable loss of India's retaliatory capability even if Pakistan launched a pre-emptive 
attack. This condition is reinforced by India's greater strategic depth, and its superior air and 
ballistic missile defenses. An air- or ballistic missile attack on India probably would elicit a strong 
response, but probably not a nuclear response. 
Conclusion  
India and Pakistan do not want war; and they certainly do not want to fight a nuclear war. As 
strong as this desire is, however, New Delhi and Islamabad are caught in a spiral of tension and 
mistrust that could cause the next regional crisis to flair into armed conflict. If India and Pakistan 
do find themselves engaged in a large-scale conventional war, escalation to a nuclear exchange 
probably would be averted because of the strategic balance that now obtains. However, their 
asymmetrical conventional force capabilities and doctrines could create pressures for one side to 
launch nuclear weapons, even if they would prefer not to. The three scenarios of inadvertent war 
outlined above show how India's superior conventional military power might so seriously degrade 
the Pakistan national command authority's confidence in its nuclear deterrent that a nuclear war 
begins that nobody wants. Even if the risk of inadvertent nuclear war is judged to be low, steps 
should be taken to ensure that India and Pakistan do not become embroiled in even a limited war. 
The United States can play a constructive role in the region by taking steps to help keep the 
peace and reorienting its arms transfer policy to help stabilize the military balance. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our South Asia Resources and WMD Proliferation and 
CounterProliferation Resources. 
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